Partisanship as a Self-Fullling Prophecy
Anke Kessler () and
Benno Buehler ()
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Anke Kessler: Simon Fraser University, https://askessler.codeberg.page/
Benno Buehler: Charles River Associates, https://ecp.crai.com/team/benno-buehler/
Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University
Abstract:
This paper develops a theory of partisanship as a self-fullling prophecy. In a simple dynamic model where officeholders have better information on which policy is best, we show that partisan divergence on policies emerges even though everyone shares identical, non-partisan preferences. If voters associate politicians' identities (e.g. party aliations) with their future policy choices, both sides can get caught in a trap of self-fulfilling expectations: because voters expect the identity of officeholders to shape their political actions, politicians are incentivized to act according to their perceived partisan identities, i.e., identities are like `sunspots' that drive subsequent policy choices only because voters think they do. The equilibrium is one of policy persistence, incumbency advantage, and political failure. If voters do not expect officeholders' identities to determine political actions, in contrast, the equilibrium is one of non-partisanship.
Date: 2026-10
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