On Evolution, Subgame Perfection and Retaliation

B. Eaton () and William Morrison ()

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University

Abstract: Two approaches to equilibrium selection are contrasted in the context of an investment-opportunism-retaliation (IOR) game. In this game, a valuable (efficient) investment may be forgone in the face of opportunistic behavior, however, players who are victims of opportunism may retaliate to the detriment of both players. In this environment, we compare sub-game perfection with the notion of evolutionary stability.

Keywords: GAMES; PRODUCTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp96-07

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