Do Two Wrongs Make a Right? Export Incentives and Bias in Trade Policy
Richard Harris and
Nicolas Schmitt ()
Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University
Two exceptions to the argument that export promotion offsets import substitution are provided. The first is based on the observation that protection in small open economies produces monopolisation of the domestic market. The second qualification stems from the discretionary and contingent nature of the administration of many export incentive schemes.
Keywords: INTERNATIONAL TRADE; PROTECTIONISM; ECONOMIC INTEGRATION; DEVELOPMENT PLANS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F11 F12 F13 F15 F23 O21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp97-02
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