EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Bidding for Labour

Benoit Julien (), John Kennes () and Ian King ()

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University

Abstract: We present a competing-auction theory of the labour market, where job candidates auction their labor services to employers. An equilibrium matching function emerges which has many of the features commonly assumed, including constant returns to scale in large economies. The auction process also generates an equilibrium wage dispersion among homogeneous workers. We characterize thge expected rate of pure "coordination unemployment": unemployment that exists purely for coordination reasons.

Keywords: LABOUR MARKET; AUCTIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 E24 J31 J41 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10) Track citations by RSS feed

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Bidding for Labor (2000) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp98-03

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Working Paper Coordinator ().

 
Page updated 2021-10-21
Handle: RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp98-03