Bidding for Labour
Benoit Julien (),
John Kennes () and
Ian King ()
Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University
We present a competing-auction theory of the labour market, where job candidates auction their labor services to employers. An equilibrium matching function emerges which has many of the features commonly assumed, including constant returns to scale in large economies. The auction process also generates an equilibrium wage dispersion among homogeneous workers. We characterize thge expected rate of pure "coordination unemployment": unemployment that exists purely for coordination reasons.
Keywords: LABOUR MARKET; AUCTIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 E24 J31 J41 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
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Journal Article: Bidding for Labor (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp98-03
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