Partnership Markets with Adverse Selection

Gregory Dow

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University

Abstract: Ownership positions in large corporations can be traded on anonymous markets, but professional partnerships and worker cooperatives do not permit members to transfer their positions to outsiders without consent from other insiders. These contrasting policies are explained by adverse selection among partners. In such a model total surplus is greater when continuing incumbents, rather than departing memebers, set the terms on which new members can join.

Keywords: ADVERSE SELECTION; OWNERSHIP (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 1998
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