Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements, Part two
Dritan Osmani and
Richard Tol
No FNU-149, Working Papers from Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University
Abstract:
We investigate the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) by applying game theory. The paper extends further our previous research on farsightedly stable coalitions and preferred farsightedly stable coalitions (Osmani & Tol 2007). The integrated assessment model FUND provides the cost-bene¯t payo® functions of pollution abatement for sixteen di®erent world regions. The stability concept of d'Aspremont et al. (1983) and farsighted stability of Chwe (1994) are compared. The d'Aspremont stability assumes that players are myopic while the farsighted stability concept captures the perfect foresight of the players and predicts which coalitions can be formed when players are farsighted. All farsightedly stable and D'Aspremont stable coalitions are found and their improvement to environment and welfare are computed.
Keywords: game theory; integrated assessment modeling; farsighted stability; D'Aspremont stability; coalition formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2007-10, Revised 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sgc:wpaper:149
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