Efficiency in rewarding academic journal publications. The case of Poland
Wojciech Charemza (),
Michal Lewandowski and
No 2021-062, Working Papers from Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis
We consider the efficiency of a mechanism for incentivising publication in academic journals where a research supervisory body awards points for papers that appear in quality publications. Building on the principal-agent literature with hidden types, we assume that such a body wants to maximise the expected prestige of academic disciplines. It sets up a reward system so that researchers who are aiming to maximise their own rewards also maximise the objective function of the research supervisory body, through their submission decisions. The model is calibrated to the reward scheme introduced within the Polish higher education reform in 2018, for which a series of policy recommendations is given
Keywords: academic publications; efficient mechanisms; optimal categorisation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C53 C55 I23 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-sog and nep-tra
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sgh:kaewps:2021062
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