Who Gets the Lion’s Share? Top Management Group Pay Disparities and Powerful CEOs
Patrick McClelland and
Tor Brodtkorb
Management Working Papers from School of Business Administration, American University of Sharjah
Abstract:
While the distribution of pay across the hierarchy of corporations has received considerable critical attention, the distribution of pay within top management groups has received comparatively little. This paper contributes to the established literature by moving the debate beyond tournament theory explanations to show that pay disparities within top management groups arise as a function of the distribution of power within them. Based on a sample of 604 publicly-traded firms drawn from the S&P 1500, a theoretical model linking sociopolitical factors in the top management group and top management group pay disparities was tested using hierarchical ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The results indicate that CEO power plays an important role in the distribution of compensation within top management groups.
Keywords: Top Management Teams/Upper Echelon; Compensation; Bonuses and Benefits; Board of Directors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://dspace.aus.edu:8443/xmlui/bitstream/handle ... tkorb.pdf?sequence=1 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to dspace.aus.edu:8443 (A connection attempt failed because the connected party did not properly respond after a period of time, or established connection failed because connected host has failed to respond.)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sha:mgtwps:04-04/2013
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Management Working Papers from School of Business Administration, American University of Sharjah Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Hamza Saleem ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).