On the Economics of Integrated Ticketing

Jolian McHardy, Michael Reynolds and Stephen Trotter

No 2005006, Working Papers from The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we explore alternative pricing and regulatory strategies within a simple transport network with Cournot duopoly and differentiated demands. We show that whilst firms always prefer to offer integrated ticketing, a social planner will not. With integrated ticketing, the firms always prefer complete collusion but there is not a uniform ranking of some of the less collusive regimes. Society generally prefers the less collusive regimes to complete collusion but prefers some collusion to independent pricing.

Keywords: Integrated ticketing; duopoly; collusion. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 R48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2005-06, Revised 2005-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.shef.ac.uk/content/1/c6/03/91/72/SERP2005006.pdf First version, 2005 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.shef.ac.uk/content/1/c6/03/91/72/SERP2005006.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/content/1/c6/03/91/72/SERP2005006.pdf)
http://www.shef.ac.uk/content/1/c6/03/91/72/SERP2005006.pdf Revised version, 2005 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.shef.ac.uk/content/1/c6/03/91/72/SERP2005006.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/content/1/c6/03/91/72/SERP2005006.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:shf:wpaper:2005006

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mike Crabtree ().