Strategic behaviour of firms in a duopoly and the impact of extending the patenting period

Tapan Biswas and Jolian McHardy

No 2010014, Working Papers from The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper deals with strategic behaviour of firms in a duopoly, subsequent to the claim by one firm that it has reduced the unit cost of production. A variety of possible strategic equilibria are discussed in the context of a duopoly game between a multinational and a local firm. In the context of an extended uniform period of patenting, as finally agreed in the Uruguay round (1994), firms have increased incentive to take patents. In the presence of cost differences, the act of taking process-patents has implications for the equilibrium output strategies of the duopoly firms and sometimes may have a negative overall welfare effect for the local producer and consumers.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; duopoly; process patenting; repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D33 D43 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2010-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.shef.ac.uk/content/1/c6/11/08/81/SERPS2010014.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.shef.ac.uk/content/1/c6/11/08/81/SERPS2010014.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/content/1/c6/11/08/81/SERPS2010014.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:shf:wpaper:2010014

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mike Crabtree ().