Competition and financial constraints: a two-sided story
Michele Bernini and
Alberto Montagnoli ()
No 2015018, Working Papers from The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics
This paper examines the relation between competitive pressure and financial constraints using firm-level survey data from 27 emerging economies of East Europe and Central Asia for the years 2005 and 2009. In the empirical analysis, we disentangle the impact of product market competition on the demand and supply of credit. Our results support the hypothesis that competitive pressure on borrowers affects both sides of the credit market. We find that in industries with greater competitive pressure firms’ demand for credit is typically higher but a greater proportion of firms are discouraged from loan application due to greater cost of credit. Interestingly, we find the detrimental effect of competitive pressure on credit access breaks down when firms are audited, they can pledge collateral and when they engage in export activities. These results point to the role of competitive pressure into the lenders’ information set when limited information is available.
Keywords: Financial constraints; Credit rationing; Competition; Transition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D22 E22 G1 P20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ger and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/economics/research/serps/articles/2015_018 First version, August 2015 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Competition and financial constraints: A two-sided story (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:shf:wpaper:2015018
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jacob Holmes ().