Platform Models and Strategic Interaction on a Multi-Agent Transport Network

Jolian McHardy

No 2023007, Working Papers from The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics

Abstract: Strategic price interaction on networks with rival and interchangeable services are well-known to produce damaging externalities with which the number of agents acting independently can interact in non-linear ways. We examine how varying the number of independent agents can impact the relative performance of platform models on a transport network whose design can mitigate some of the damaging externalities in the 2-agent setting. We show that increasing the number of agents can preserve or enhance some of the benefits of the platform models under some circumstances but the platform structure, that abates damaging externalities with 2-agents, can constrain beneficial competitive forces with more agents, damaging relative performance.

Keywords: Platform; Strategic Interaction; Multi-operator; Transport Network; Pricing; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L91 R40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2023-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-pay, nep-reg, nep-tre and nep-ure
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https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/economics/research/serps First version, March 17 2023 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:shf:wpaper:2023007

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