Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments: A Meta-Comment on Cross-Cultural Differences

Subhasish Chowdhury and Matteo M. Marini

No 2023016, Working Papers from The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics

Abstract: We revisit the analyses by Sheremeta (2013) and Chowdhury and Moffatt (2017), who pool experimental data from 30 Tullock contests to explain the phenomenon of overbid- ding. The authors find that the overbidding rate is positively related to the number of contestants and has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the relative endowment. We reuse their data and extend the analysis in the direction of cross-cultural differ- ences, focusing on ethno-linguistic-religious fractionalization as a country-level measure. The results suggest an increased explanatory power of the model, with fractionalization negatively relating to overbidding. In addition, the extended model shows that in the one-shot game the overbidding rate is significantly higher than in the case of repeated interactions. We discuss possible interpretations of our findings.

Keywords: meta-analysis; contests; experiments; overbidding; fractionalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2023-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/economics/research/serps First version, August 01 2023 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Overbidding and heterogeneous behavior in contest experiments:A meta-comment on cross-cultural differences (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:shf:wpaper:2023016

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