Existence of majority equilibria with non-ordered preferences

Hervé Crès () and Mich Tvede ()
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Hervé Crès: Division of Social Science, New York University in Abu Dhabi, 129188, Abu Dhabi, UAE
Mich Tvede: School of Economics, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10 2TU, UK

No 2025010, Working Papers from The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics

Abstract: Majority voting is widely observed to produce stable policy outcomes, despite theoretical predictions of instability in multidimensional policy spaces. The present paper shows that stability can arise because voters have non-ordered preferences. We model preferences as correspondences within d-dimensional policy spaces and introduce a geometric measure of orderedness based on the angular spread α of strictly preferred alternatives. Our main result is that majority equilibria exist provided α

Keywords: ambiguity; centerpoint theorem; collective decision-making; Euclidean preferences; majority equilibrium; non-ordered preferences; status quo bias; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C65 D71 D72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2025-10
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