Taxation under Autocracy: Theory and Evidence from Late Imperial China

Qiang Chen, Yijiang Wang and Chun-lei Yang ()
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Chun-lei Yang: RCHSS, Academia Sinica

SDU Working Papers from School of Economics, Shandong University

Abstract: We model a game to show that the taxation level in an autocracy reflects the state¡¯s coercive power relative to people¡¯s capacity for violence. The model also specifies the mechanisms through which various factors affect relative state power. The model predicts that taxation level increases with state coercion level, efficiency of coercion technology, cost of rebelling, and likely labor incomes. Data from late imperial China are used to test the hypotheses, and the findings are entirely consistent with the predictions of the theory.

Keywords: Taxation; Autocracy; State power; Rebellion; Imperial China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H20 N45 O11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2014-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna
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