Can Safety Nets Offset the Impact of Risk on Wage Inequality and Social Welfare?

Paul Makdissi () and Quentin Wodon

Cahiers de recherche from Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke

Abstract: Income variablity reduces social welfare if individuals are risk averse, and it is likely to increase inequality if poorer households are more vulnerable to shocks. Using a simple method to estimate risk-adjusted measures of inequality and welfare and wage data from Mexico, this note shows that it is easier for safety nets to offset the impact of risk on wage inequality than on welfare. This is because apart from its impact on inequality, risk reduces the certainty equivalent income of individuals.

Keywords: Inequality; Welfare; Risk; Safety Nets; Mexico (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D81 I30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2002, Revised 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:shr:wpaper:02-08

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