Charitable Dictators? Determinants of Giving to NGOs in Uganda

Kim Lehrer () and Catherine Porter
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Kim Lehrer: Département d'Économique, Université de Sherbrooke

Cahiers de recherche from Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke

Abstract: We play a modified dictator game in Uganda with students, civil servants, and individ- uals from the private sector. The sample includes both Ugandans and expatriates. In the dictator game, participants divide a sum of (real) money between themselves and a local charity. In a "turning a blind eye" treatment, participants are rst given the choice of knowing the identity of the recipient. Finally, participants are asked whether they wish to add their own money to the amount of the endowment they chose to allocate to their selected charity. Contrary to many experimental findings, non-students (civil servants) are not significantly more generous than students. In fact, after controlling for demographic characteristics, their average donation is significantly lower than that of students. Very few individuals donate their own money, despite 30% of participants donating the full endowment. Attitudes to charities do not predict the amount donated in the expected way. Length: 36 pages

Keywords: Dictator game; charitable giving; philanthropy; Uganda (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Charitable Dictators? Determinants of Giving to NGOs in Uganda (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:shr:wpaper:15-07

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