On Income and Utility Generalised Transfer Principles in a Welfarist-Paretian Separable Framework

Marc Dubois () and Stéphane Mussard

Cahiers de recherche from Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke

Abstract: The aim of the paper is to investigate the interplay between both transfer principles defined on incomes and utilities. For instance, a social planner who respects an income transfer principle of a given order is not necessarily incline to support the utility transfer principle of the corresponding order. Utility transfer principles are useful to characterize social planners' attitudes towards inequality but redistributive justice is often empirically assessed on income transfers, and as such it seems interesting to have an overview of different types of social planners who respect (or not) an income transfer principle. The main result of the paper is the determination of a generalised critical value that displays attitudes towards inequality which are necessary and sufficient for the respect of all income transfer principles up to any order. Our results give sufficient conditions to state stochastic dominance of income distributions as a factual moral statement.

Keywords: Bell's polynomial; Inequality aversion; Prioritarianism; Transfer principles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D3 D6 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:shr:wpaper:15-09

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