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Payment and Provision Consequentiality in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism: Single or Double “Knife-Edge” Evidence?

Jie He (), Jérôme Dupras () and Thomas G. Poder
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Jie He: Département d'économique, École de gestion, Université de Sherbrooke
Jérôme Dupras: UQO
Thomas G. Poder: Centre de Recherche du CHUS, Université de Sherbrooke

Cahiers de recherche from Departement d'Economique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke

Abstract: We conducted a field stated preferences survey to understand the joint and separate effects of payment and provision consequences on hypothetical bias associated with voluntary contribution. Based on four treatment groups and a contingent-ranking willingness to pay (WTP) question, this paper provides some support for “single” knife-edge evidence, which suggests that a respondent facing positive provision consequences will report a significantly higher preference only if the payment consequence is co-presented. For the payment consequence, its negative impact on WTP was independent on the presence of provision consequence; we therefore reject the “double” knife-edge evidence.

Keywords: hypothetical bias; knife-edge evidence; payment consequence; provision consequence; contingent ranking; voluntary donation; ecosystem services valuation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-knm and nep-mac
Date: 2018-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:shr:wpaper:18-02

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