Do Elected Public Utility Commissioners Behave More Politically than Appointed Ones?

Troy Quast ()
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Troy Quast: Department of Economics and International Business, Sam Houston State University

No 603, Working Papers from Sam Houston State University, Department of Economics and International Business

Abstract: This paper investigates whether the means by which public utility commissioners are selected affects the influence of political affiliation on policy choices. This question is asked in the context of telecommunications network lease prices and retail prices. While political affiliation appears to have limited influence on lease prices set by appointed commissioners, it has a significant impact when these prices are set by elected commissioners. Conversely, the political affiliation of appointed regulators appears to affect retail prices, whereas the political affiliation of elected commissioners does not.

Date: 2006-09
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http://www.shsu.edu/academics/economics-and-intern ... p_series/wp06-03.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Do elected public utility commissioners behave more politically than appointed ones? (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:shs:wpaper:0603

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