Altruism and Donations

Sao-Wen Cheng (cheng@vwl.wiwi.uni-siegen.de) and Andreas Wagener

Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge from Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht

Abstract: We examine two types of altruism and their implications for voluntary giving. Philanthropists are altruists who wish to enhance the well-being of others, while individuals with merit-good preferences only wish to further the consumption of certain merit goods by others. Philanthropic donors prefer to make cash donations, while donors with merit-good preferences prefer to give in kind. The equilibrium of a donations-game with a philanthropic donor and recipients is efficient, while the equilibrium of a game with a single donor with merit-good preferences is not. Both equilibria are inefficient if there are multiple donors with strategic interaction amongst them.

JEL-codes: C70 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2000-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sie:siegen:92-00

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