Removing Disability Insurance Coverage: The Effects on Work Incentive and Occupation Choice

Atsuko Tanaka (), Nguyen Ha () and Hsuan-Chih (Luke) Lin ()
Additional contact information
Atsuko Tanaka: Department of Economics, University of Calgary, http://econ.ucalgary.ca/
Hsuan-Chih (Luke) Lin: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, https://www.econ.sinica.edu.tw/

No 16-A008, IEAS Working Paper : academic research from Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan

Abstract: This paper studies how removing disability insurance coverage affects workers’work incentive and occupation choice. To do so, we exploit the 1997 Canadian Pension Plan (CPP) disability program reform, which required longer work experience for individuals to be eligible for disability insurance. The empirical strategy includes difference-in-difference and tripledifference estimations. The results show that the reform significantly increased work incentive for male individuals with a long non-employment spell. However, the rise in work incentive increased only unemployment, not employment. We also find that the reform barely affected the distribution of employment across occupation.

Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2016-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger, nep-ias and nep-pbe
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econ.sinica.edu.tw/~econ/pdfPaper/16-A008.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Removing Disability Insurance Coverage: The Effects on Work Incentive and Occupation Choice (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sin:wpaper:16-a008

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IEAS Working Paper : academic research from Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by HsiaoyunLiu ().