Virtual implementation by bounded mechanisms: Complete information
Ritesh Jain () and
Michele Lombardi ()
Additional contact information
Ritesh Jain: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, http://www.econ.sinica.edu.tw/english/
Michele Lombardi: Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow., https://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/business/
No 19-A001, IEAS Working Paper : academic research from Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
A social choice rule (SCR) F maps preference profiles to lotteries over some finite set of outcomes. F is virtually implementable in (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria provided that for all E > 0, there exists a mechanism such that for each preference profile t, its set of Nash equilibrium outcomes at t is E-closed to the socially desirable set F(t). Under a domain restriction, we obtain the following result: When there are at least three agents, any F is virtually implementable in Nash equilibrium, as well as in rationalizable strategies, by a bounded mechanism. No "tail-chasing" constructions, common in the constructive proofs of the literature, is used to assure that undesired strategy combinations do not form a Nash equilibrium.
Keywords: : Virtual implementation; pure and mixed Nash equilibria; rationalizability; social choice rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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