Broadcasting and Team Sports

Roger Noll

No 06-016, Discussion Papers from Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Television rights are the largest component of revenues for major sports in large, rich nations. Among these nations, the market structure for rights varies due to different competition policies towards sports and television. This essay examines how game coverage, revenues and competitive balance are affected by competition in commercial television and sales of rights. It argues that consumers are better off if television is competitive and leagues do not centralize rights sales. We conclude that centralization of rights sales does not improve competitive balance or benefit financially weak teams. Finally, while digital telecommunications are making television competitive, ending centralization of sales by leagues requires policy intervention.

Keywords: broadcasting rights; sports teams (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Related works:
Journal Article: BROADCASTING AND TEAM SPORTS (2007)
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