EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Marrying Up: The Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching

Ran Abramitzky (), Adeline Delavande () and Luis Vasconcelos ()
Additional contact information
Ran Abramitzky: Stanford University

No 09-030, Discussion Papers from Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: By observing the large negative exogenous shock to the French male population from to WWI casualties, we study the effect of a change in the sex ratio on marital assortative matching by social class. First, we analyzed a novel data set that links marriage-level to French population and military mortality. Then, we calculated the sex ratio in a region with military mortality, which exhibits exogenous geographic variation. Ultiamtely, we found that men married women of higher social class than themselves more often in regions that experienced a larger decrease in the sex ratio. A decrease in the sex ratio of man to woman from 1.00 to 0.90 increased the probability that men married up by 8 percent. These findings provide insight into individuals’ preferences for spouses. Men appear to prefer to marry higher-class spouses, but cannot do so when the sex ratio is balanced.

Keywords: Marriage; sex ratio; assortative matching; social classes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J12 N34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/repec/sip/09-030.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to www-siepr.stanford.edu:80 (No such host is known. )

Related works:
Journal Article: Marrying Up: The Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Marrying Up: The Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Marrying Up: The Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching (2008) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sip:dpaper:09-030

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anne Shor ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).

 
Page updated 2023-03-23
Handle: RePEc:sip:dpaper:09-030