Fixing the Patent Office

Mark Lemley ()
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Mark Lemley: Stanford University

No 11-014, Discussion Papers from Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: How can we allow patent examiners to effectively distinguish between patentable and unpatentable inventions, without slowing the process to a crawl or wasting a bunch of money? This essay reviews the recent literature and considers a number of proposals and their limitations. It concludes that the system can be improved, but that we are unlikely to solve the problem of bad patents altogether. The focus in reform discussions should be on understanding and changing applicant and examiner incentives rather than simply spending money.

JEL-codes: K30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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