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Worker Cooperatives and Democratic Governance

John Pencavel

No 12-003, Discussion Papers from Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: A worker co-operative is a firm that is owned and managed by those who work in it. This paper provides a selective review of research in economics on worker cooperatives. It concentrates on the volatility of earnings and employment in the co-ops compared with conventional capitalist firms; on the long-term viability of co-ops; on the relative productive efficiency of co-ops; and on problems of democratic governance within co-ops. Using modern empirical methods applied to large numbers of observations, recent research has substantially enhanced our understanding of worker co-ops.

Keywords: worker cooperatives; productivity; viability; governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hme and nep-hrm
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Chapter: Worker cooperatives and democratic governance (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Worker Cooperatives and Democratic Governance (2012) Downloads
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