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R&D Networks: Theory, Empirics and Policy Implications

Michael Koenig (), Xiaodong Liu and Yves Zenou
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Michael Koenig: Stanford University

Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Michael David König

No 13-027, Discussion Papers from Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study a structural model of R&D alliance networks in which firms jointly form R&D collaborations to lower their production costs while competing on the product market. We derive the Nash equilibrium of this game, provide a welfare analysis and determine the optimal R&D subsidy program that maximizes total welfare. We also identify the key firms, i.e. the firms whose exit would reduce welfare the most. We then structurally estimate our model using a panel dataset of R&D collaborations and annual company reports. We use our estimates to identify the key firms and analyze the impact of R&D subsidy programs. Moreover, we analyze temporal changes in the rankings of key firms and how these changes affect the optimal R&D policy.

Keywords: R&D networks; key firms; optimal subsidies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D85 L24 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (47)

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http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/repec/sip/13-027.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: R&D Networks: Theory, Empirics, and Policy Implications (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: R&D Networks: Theory, Empirics and Policy Implications (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: R&D networks: theory, empirics and policy implications (2014) Downloads
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