Micro-finance Competition: Motivated Micro-lenders, Double-dipping and Default
Brishti Guha () and
Prabal Roy Chowdhury ()
No 04-2012, Working Papers from Singapore Management University, School of Economics
We develop a tractable model of competition among motivated MFIs. We find that equilibria may or may not involve double-dipping (and consequently default), with there being double-dipping whenever the MFIs are very profit-oriented. Moreover, in an equilibrium with double-dipping, borrowers who double-dip are actually worse off compared to those who do not. Further, for intermediate levels of motivation, there can be multiple equilibria, with a double-dipping equilibrium co-existing with a no default equilibrium. Interestingly, an increase in MFI competition can lower efficiency, as well as increase the extent of double-dipping and default. Further, the interest rates may go either way, with the interest rate likely to increase if the MFIs are very motivated.
Keywords: Micro-finance competition; motivated MFIs; double-dipping; default (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D40 D82 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mfd and nep-sea
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Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series
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Journal Article: Micro-finance competition: Motivated micro-lenders, double-dipping and default (2013)
Working Paper: Micro-finance Competition: Motivated Micro-lenders, Double-dipping and Default (2013)
Working Paper: Micro-finance competition: Motivated micro-lenders, double-dipping and default (2012)
Working Paper: Micro-finance competition: motivated micro-lenders, double-dipping and default (2012)
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