Rational and boundedly rational behavior in sender-receiver games

Massimiliano Landi and Domenico Colucci

No 14-2006, Working Papers from Singapore Management University, School of Economics

Abstract: We consider a signalling game in which a population of receivers decide on the outcome by majority rule, sender and receivers have conflicting interests, and there is uncertainty about both players’ types. We model players rationality along the lines of recent findings in behavioral game theory. We characterize the structure of the equilibria in the reduced game so obtained. We find that all pure strategy equilibria are consistent with successful attempts to mislead the receivers, and relate them to the message bin Laden sent on the eve of the 2004 US Presidential elections. The same result holds if we allow for some uncertainty about the sign of the correlation between the sender’s and the receivers’ payoffs.

Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2005-10, Revised 2006-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series

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Related works:
Working Paper: Rational and Boundedly Rational Behavior in Sender-receiver Games (2006)
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