Divorce Laws, Sex Ratios and the Marriage Market
Brishti Guha ()
No 19-2012, Working Papers from Singapore Management University, School of Economics
I show how an interaction between the imbalance of the sex ratio and the jump in divorce rates after a liberalization in divorce laws can obtain in a model of marriage market matching with non-transferable utility. If sex ratios are more unbalanced, the size of the jump in divorce rates following a transition from mutual consent to unilateral divorce will be larger. This works through two interacting sources of asymmetry, the first in remarriage odds between the sexes, the second in the impact of divorce law regime on the ease of obtaining a divorce.
Keywords: Divorce; sex ratios; marriage market; imbalance; matching; non-transferable utility. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J12 K36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem and nep-sea
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Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series
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