The Evolution and Utilization of the GATT/WTO Dispute

Pao-Li Chang ()

No 21-2007, Working Papers from Singapore Management University, School of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides a theoretical framework of dispute settlement to explain the surge in blocking incidence of GATT panel reports during the 1980s and the variations in withdrawn incidence versus total disputes across di®erent decades of the GATT regime. The study first suggests the role of the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling in determining countries' incentives to block (appeal) a panel report under the GATT (WTO) regime. The study then analyzes the effects of political power on countries' incentives to use, and their interactions in using, the dispute settlement mechanism, when two-sided asymmetric information exists regarding panel judgement.

Keywords: dispute settlement; legal controversy; block; appeal; two-sided asymmetric information; political cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F02 F13 K33 K41 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2007-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series

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