Procrastination, Self-Imposed Deadlines and Other Commitment Devices
Kyle Hyndman and
Alberto Bisin
No 904, Departmental Working Papers from Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics
Abstract:
In this paper we model a decision maker who must exert costly effort to complete a single task by a fixed deadline. Effort costs evolve stochastically in continuous time. The decision maker will then optimally wait to exert effort until costs are less than a given threshold, the solution to an optimal stopping time problem. We derive the solution to this model for three cases: (1) time consistent decision makers, (2) naive hyperbolic discounters and (3) sophisticated hyperbolic discounters. Sophisticated hyperbolic discounters behave as if they were time consistent but instead have a smaller reward for completing the task. We show that sophisticated decision makers will often self-impose a deadline to ensure early completion of the task. Other forms of commitment are also discussed.
Keywords: Procrastination; hyperbolic discounting; time inconsistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
Downloads: (external link)
https://ftp1.economics.smu.edu/WorkingPapers/2009/HYNDMAN/HYNDMAN-2009-03.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Procrastination, self-imposed deadlines and other commitment devices (2022) 
Working Paper: Procrastination, self-imposed deadlines and other commitment devices (2009) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:smu:ecowpa:0904
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Departmental Working Papers from Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics Department of Economics, P.O. Box 750496, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275-0496.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ömer Özak ().