Credit Attribution and Collaborative Work
Saltuk Özerturk () and
Huseyin Yildirim ()
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Saltuk Özerturk: Southern Methodist University
Huseyin Yildirim: Duke University
No 1907, Departmental Working Papers from Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics
We examine a dynamic model of teamwork in which the public attributes credit for success based on its perception of individual efforts. The collaborative behavior varies starkly depending on the shape of marginal effort cost, or project's "difficulty." In the unique (interior) equilibrium, higher ability collaborators work less and thus receive lower credit and payoff for "easy" projects, while the reverse holds for "difficult" projects. Despite free-riding, the team equilibrium may involve over-investment. Social efficiency requires over-rewarding collaborative work and under-rewarding solo work. The incentives to team up and the impact of effort monitoring on credit attribution are also investigated.
Keywords: Teamwork; Collaboration; Credit; Project Difficulty. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D86 H41 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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