Optimal Central Counterparty Risk Management
Philipp Haene and
No 2009-07, Working Papers from Swiss National Bank
In order to protect themselves against the potential losses in case of a participant's default and to contain systemic risk, central counterparties (CCPs) need to maintain sufficient financial resources. Typically, these financial resources consist of margin requirements and contributions to a collective default fund. Based on a stylized model of CCP risk management, this article analyzes the main factors affecting the trade-off between margins and default fund. The optimal balance between these two risk management instruments is found to depend on collateral costs, participants' default probability, and the extent to which margin requirements are associated with risk-mitigating incentives. Given the increasing role of CCPs in financial markets in general and for financial stability in particular, these considerations are not only important for CCPs themselves, but also for financial regulators.
Keywords: Central counterparty; margin requirements; default fund; financial stability; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G23 G32 G18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.snb.ch/n/mmr/reference/working_paper_2 ... _paper_2009_07.n.pdf (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:snb:snbwpa:2009-07
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Swiss National Bank Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Enzo Rossi ().