Optimal monetary policy with the risk-taking channel
Angela Abbate () and
Dominik Thaler
No 2021-09, Working Papers from Swiss National Bank
Abstract:
Empirical research suggests that lower interest rates induce banks to take higher risks. We assess analytically what this risk-taking channel implies for optimal monetary policy in a tractable New Keynesian model. We show that this channel creates a motive for the planner to stabilize the real rate. This objective conflicts with the standard inflation stabilization objective. Optimal policy thus tolerates more inflation volatility. An inertial Taylor-type reaction function becomes optimal. We then quantify the significance of the risk-taking channel for monetary policy in an estimated medium-scale extension of the model. Ignoring the channel when designing policy entails non-negligible welfare costs (0.7% lifetime consumption equivalent).
Keywords: Risk-taking channel; optimal monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Journal Article: Optimal monetary policy with the risk-taking channel (2023) 
Working Paper: Optimal monetary policy with the risk-taking channel (2023) 
Working Paper: Optimal Monetary Policy with the Risk-Taking Channel (2021) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:snb:snbwpa:2021-09
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