Characterizations of Some Strategyproof Mechanisms in the Queueing Problem

Youngsub Chun, Manipushpak Mitra and Suresh Mutuswami

Working Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University

Abstract: We investigate mechanisms satisfying queue efficiency, equal treatment of equals and strategyproofness in the context of queueing models. We give two results here. First, we present a simpler proof of Kayi and Ramaekers¡¯ [9] characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG mechanism. Second, we use independence axioms, introduced by Chun [2] and Maniquet [10], to characterize the pivotal and the rewardbased pivotal mechanisms (Mitra and Mutuswami [12]).

Keywords: Queueing problem; equal treatment of equals; strategyproofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
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