 Auctioning and Selling Positions: a noncooperative approach to queueing conflictsYuan Ju, Youngsub Chun and Rene van den Brink Working Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University Abstract: Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing con icts. Given a situation where players with di erent waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they rstly compete with each other for a speci c position in the queue. Then, the winner can decide to take up the position or sell it to the others. In the former case, the rest of the players will proceed to compete for the remaining positions in the same manner; whereas for the latter case the seller can propose a queue with corresponding payments to the others which can be accepted or rejected. Depending on which position players are going to compete for, the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the corresponding mechanism coincides with one of the two best known rules for queueing problems, the maximal and the minimal transfer rules, while an efficient queue is always formed in equilibrium. The analysis discovers a striking relationship between pessimism and optimism in this type of decision making. Keywords: Queueing problem; minimal transfer rule; maximal transfer rule; Shapley value; bidding mechanism; implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:snu:ioerwp:no91 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Working Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University Contact information at EDIRC. |
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