Strategic Interactions on Networks: An Experimental Approach

Eungik Lee

Working Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University

Abstract: network influence the equilibrium selection and behavior in a network public goods game. Bramoulle et al (2014) shows that the equilibrium of the public good game can be characterized according to the simple characteristics of the underlying network. Precisely, guided by the theoretical predictions from Bramoulle et al(2014), I explore whether underlying networks can predict equilibrium selection and subjects¡¯ behavior in the controlled laboratory. The data implies that 1) there is some aspect in which agents¡¯ actions are consistent with the claims of Bramoulle et al(2014), but 2) local, rather than global, characteristics of the network are more fundamental in influencing behavior and equilibrium selection. Specifically, I show that asymmetry inside of network is a major factor in explaining the actions of individual economic agents.

Keywords: Network; local public good games; experiment; strategic substitute (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D00 D81 D85 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:snu:ioerwp:no95

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