Control consolidation with a threshold: an algorithm

Ariane Chapelle () and Ariane Szafarz

No 06-007.RS, Working Papers CEB from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: Control tunnelling over firms can be reached through pyramids, cross-ownership, and other complex features. This phenomenon is frequent in Europe and in Asia. However, the theoretical literature has not yet converged toward a well-defined and robust measurement of integrated control that takes into account the threshold for control as applied in practice. Based on graph theory, this paper aims at filling this gap and proposes a new algorithm for evaluating the control tunnelling exerted by the firms' ultimate shareholders. Then, the paper discusses the various forms of control existing next to voting shares, like multiple voting rights, board representation and active monitoring, before suggesting ways to include them into the modelling of control.

Keywords: Ownership; Corporate control; ultimate shareholder. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C67 G32 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 p.
Date: 2006-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin and nep-sea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published by: Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Business School, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Control consolidation with a threshold: An algorithm (2007)
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