Defining Social Collateral in Microfinance Group Lending
Luminita Postelnicu,
Niels Hermes () and
Ariane Szafarz
No 13-050, Working Papers CEB from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles
Abstract:
Microfinance group lending with joint liability allows asset-poor individuals to replace physical collateral by social collateral. The literature on microfinance lacks a rigid framework for analyzing the consequences of using social collateral for borrowing behavior and repayment. This paper fills the gap by providing a theoretical framework to evaluate the impact of social collateral pledged by group borrowers on group lending repayment. Our approach is novel as we take into account the external ties of group borrowers, i.e. the social ties linking borrowers to non-borrowers from their community, whereas previous work in this field has looked solely at internal ties (i.e. between group members). One of the important features of our model is that we stress the impact of network configuration on the amount of social collateral pledged. Our model shows why the group lending methodology works better in rural areas than in urban areas, namely because rural social networks are typically denser than urban ones, which results in higher social collateral.
Keywords: Social Capital; Social Collateral; Group Lending; Repayment Performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 D85 G21 O16 O18 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 p.
Date: 2013-12-19
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
Published by:
Downloads: (external link)
https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/152950/12/wp13050.pdf wp13050 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Chapter: Defining Social Collateral in Microfinance Group Lending (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sol:wpaper:2013/152950
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://hdl.handle.ne ... lb.ac.be:2013/152950
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers CEB from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Benoit Pauwels ().