Lobbying against Environmental Regulation vs. Lobbying for Loopholes

Andreas Polk and Armin Schmutzler

No 301, SOI - Working Papers from Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich

Abstract: We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but has a negative or zero effect on the allowed emissions of the competitor. We determine the lobbying equilibrium and discuss the resulting emission level. In many cases, a higher effectiveness of private lobbying is detrimental for firms and beneficial for environmental quality, as it induces firms to turn towards excessive amounts of relatively unproductive private lobbying.

Keywords: environmental regulation; pollution standards; interest groups; lobbying; policy making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2003-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in European Journal of Political Economy 21, 2005, pages 915-931

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https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/52173/1/wp0301.pdf First version, 2003 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Lobbying against environmental regulation vs. lobbying for loopholes (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:soz:wpaper:0301

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