Determinants of Successful Cooperation in a Face-to-Face Social Dilemma
Donja Darai () and
Silvia Grï¿½tz ()
Additional contact information
Silvia Grï¿½tz: Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich
No 1006, SOI - Working Papers from Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich
What makes you a successful cooperator? Using data from the British television game show "Golden Balls" we analyze a prisoner's dilemma game and its pre-play. We find that players strategically select their partner for the PD, e.g., they bear in mind whether contestants lied. Players' expectations about the stake size strongly influence the outcome of the PD: The lower the stakes, the more likely players successfully cooperate. Most interestingly, unilateral cooperation is encouraged by mutually promising not to defect and shaking hands on it, but a mere handshake serves as manipulating device and increases successful defection.
Keywords: prisoner's dilemma; cooperative behavior; communication; promises; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C93 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
Date: 2010-07, Revised 2010-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp_soi/wp1006.pdf Revised version, 2010 (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Determinants of Successful Cooperation in a Face-to-Face Social Dilemma (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:soz:wpaper:1006
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in SOI - Working Papers from Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marita Kieser (). This e-mail address is bad, please contact .