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Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence

Filipe Campante (), Quoc-Anh Do () and Bernardo Guimaraes

No 2014-13, Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers from Sciences Po Departement of Economics

Abstract: We investigate the links between capital cities, conict, and the quality of governance, starting from the assumption that incumbent elites are constrained by the threat of insurrection, and that this threat is rendered less e_ective by distance from the seat of political power. We develop a model that delivers two key predictions: (i) conict is more likely to emerge (and to dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital, and (ii) isolated capital cities are associated with misgovernance. We show evidence that both patterns hold true robustly in the data, as do other ancillary predictions from the model.

Keywords: Capital Cities; Governance; Institutions; Conflict; Civil War; Revolutions; Insurgencies; Population Concentration; Democracy; Power Sharing; Inefficient Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D74 O18 R12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gro, nep-pol and nep-ure
Date: 2014-10
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Related works:
Working Paper: Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence (2014) Downloads
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