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Voting and Contributing While the Group is Watching

Emeric Henry and Charles Louis-Sidois
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Charles Louis-Sidois: Département d'économie

No 2018-11, Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers from Sciences Po Departement of Economics

Abstract: Members of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project: in particular, they want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study, from both a positive and normative perspective, the interaction between the way members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show how endogenous norms can emerge. We study in particular the role played by the visibility of individual actions, votes or contributions. While making votes visible always increases welfare in our setting, making contributions public can be welfare decreasing as it makes some rules more likely to be rejected.

Keywords: Image concern; Voting; Public good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 H41 D23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-soc
Date: 2018-09
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