Allocating macro-prudential powers

Daniel Gros, Sam Langfield, Marco Pagano and Dirk Schoenmaker

No 5, Report of the Advisory Scientific Committee from European Systemic Risk Board

Abstract: Monetary, macro-prudential and micro-prudential policies are intimately linked. The macroprudential authority should be allocated to the body where the overall balance of synergies (between policy objectives) over conflicts and the required expertise are the largest. This report reviews the pros and cons of the four institutional models for the allocation of macro-prudential powers: (1) the government, (2) the central bank, (3) the financial authority and (4) a committee with representatives from these three bodies. JEL Classification: G28

Keywords: macroprudential regulation; economic policy; governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10
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