How excessive is banks’ maturity transformation?

Anatoli Segura and Javier Suarez

No 3, ESRB Working Paper Series from European Systemic Risk Board

Abstract: We quantify the gains from regulating maturity transformation in a model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors’ preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic crises. Pecuniary externalities make unregulated debt maturities inefficiently short. The calibration of the model to Eurozone banking data for 2006 yields that lengthening the average maturity of wholesale debt from its 2.8 months to 3.3 months would produce welfare gains with a present value of euro 105 billion, while the lengthening induced by the NSRF would be too drastic. JEL Classification: G01, G21, G28

Keywords: liquidity risk; maturity regulation; pecuniary externalities; systemic crises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: How Excessive Is Banks’ Maturity Transformation? (2017)
Working Paper: How excessive is banks’ maturity transformation? (2016)
Working Paper: How Excessive is Banks’ Maturity Transformation? (2016)
Working Paper: How Excessive Is Banks' Maturity Transformation? (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:srk:srkwps:20163

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