Uncertainty and International Negotiations on Tradable Quota Treaties

Morten Søberg ()
Additional contact information
Morten Søberg: Statistics Norway, https://www.ssb.no/en/forskning/ansatte

Discussion Papers from Statistics Norway, Research Department

Abstract: Negotiating an international tradable quota treaty between industrialised and developing countries is complicated by uncertain marginal abatement costs and non-uniform quota prices. An initial quota allocation that implies zero expected net cost to developing countries will typically be insufficient to attract their participation in the treaty. Two options to compensate for uncertainty are discussed here, extra emissions quotas and financial transfers. The latter is found to be more effective in facilitating treaty-making, but the scope of co-operation is restricted by the developing countries' risk-aversion.

Keywords: Tradable quotas; uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ssb.no/a/publikasjoner/pdf/DP/dp233.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ssb:dispap:233

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Statistics Norway, Research Department P.O.Box 8131 Dep, N-0033 Oslo, Norway. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by L Maasø ().