Imperfect competition, sequential auctions, and emissions trading: An experimental evaluation

Morten Søberg ()
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Morten Søberg: Statistics Norway, https://www.ssb.no/en/forskning/ansatte

Discussion Papers from Statistics Norway, Research Department

Abstract: This paper reports an experiment that studies the behavior of a monopolist on sequential auction markets for tradable permits. Using six sessions in a triple ABA crossover design, we investigate the cost-effectiveness of permit allocations and the division of trade gains on sequential bid, offer, and double auction markets. The main result is that cost-effectiveness and supra-competitive profits accrued by the monopolist are observed on all the three auction markets.

Keywords: Market power; tradable permits; and experimental economics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 L12 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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