Market Institutions and Allocations

G.. Green

Working Papers from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics

Abstract: We show for general class of market environments that there exist allocations that cannot be improved upon by allocations that are obtainable in the nash equilibrium of alternative noncooperative games. We take account of the fact that in such alternative games, individuals will draw inferences about other's types when the participate in the alternative game.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM; MARKET (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ste:nystbu:96-05

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, 44 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012-1126. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Amanda Murphy ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).